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Abstract 
How does one analyze the memorialization or remembrance of an event, or pair of 
events, when they have been nearly forgotten? To many individuals, the Herero and Nama 
Genocide in Namibia and the Maji Maji Rebellion in Tanzania are unknown; however, these two 
events decimated a region and left a lasting impact that is still felt to this day. In recent years, the 
Herero and Nama tragedy has become increasingly well-known to the international community. 
But why has this genocide in Namibia become the focus of attention, while the atrocities in 
Tanzania have remained largely unknown? Namibia’s connections to the Holocaust, in the form 
of concentration camps, medical experimentation, and personal connections, have led many to 
believe the event set a precedent for the Nazis; this, in turn, has led to more intense examination 
and analysis of the event by scholars. Additionally, Namibia’s victims’ human remains were sent 
to museums around the world, thus globalizing the genocide in Namibia. Further, the Herero 
tribe in Namibia, which was nearly destroyed in the genocide, experienced a revival of power in 
the 1920s, which culminated in the rise of a political party and kept the memory of the genocide 
alive. Conversely, the core of the rebellion in Tanzania was driven by shamanism and witchcraft. 
The witchcraft eradication movements which swept through Tanzania in the aftermath of the 
rebellion destroyed the core of the Maji Maji Rebellion. Furthermore, the tribes at the core of the 
rebellion in Namibia were eventually forcibly settled and decentralized, losing their power and 
thus, losing their voice. Numbers, in both terms of German casualties and tribes involved, have 
led to the Herero and Nama event receiving increased coverage as more Germans died in 
Namibia and fewer tribes were involved.   
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“German imperialism had largely broken the Herero’s and Nama’s power to resist, so that 
in the remaining years of German colonial rule the peace of the graveyard reigned in the 
territory.”1 Horst Drechsler’s adaption of a quote from German colonial official Paul Rohrbach 
fittingly describes the silence that befell the region of present-day Namibia after two tribes – the 
Herero and Nama - were nearly wiped from existence. How does one analyze the 
memorialization or remembrance of an event, or pair of events, when they have been nearly 
forgotten? To many, the Herero and Nama Genocide in German Southwest Africa and the Maji 
Maji Rebellion in East Africa are unknown; however, these two events decimated a region and 
left a lasting impact that is still felt to this day. The human costs of these two forgotten tragedies 
were enormous and shockingly one sided, with one side losing nearly all the victims, but little 
physical evidence remains and the memory of these events have all but disappeared. If these 
events are not widely remembered or memorialized, how does one analyze the remembrance of 
these events in Southwest Africa and East Africa? In reviewing subsequent literature and news 
media regarding these two events, it becomes apparent that the Herero and Nama tragedy has, 
only recently, become more well-known to the international community. But why has the 
genocide in Namibia become the focus of attention, both within the country and internationally, 
and not the atrocities in Tanzania? Connections to the Holocaust, in the form of concentration 
camps, medical experimentation, and personal connections, has led many to say the Namibia 
genocide set a precedent for the Nazis, leading to a closer examination of the event. Additionally, 
the genocide in Southwest Africa has become more globalized, with many of the human physical 
remains sent to museums around the world, even reaching locations in the United States and 
Germany. The Herero eventually regained political clout and wielded a stronger political 
                                                          
1 Horst Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting: the struggle of the Herero and Nama against German imperialism (1884-1915) (New 
York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1981), 231.  
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apparatus in the aftermath of the killings. Conversely, the witchcraft eradication movements 
which swept through Tanganyika—modern day Tanzania—largely stamped out the core of the 
Maji Maji Rebellion. Eventually the tribes became settled and decentralized and lost their 
political clout. Additionally, the larger numbers of German dead in Southwest Africa may 
correlate with increasing coverage, and subsequent remembrance, in German newspapers 
compared to the rebellion in Tanganyika, where far fewer German soldiers died. The number of 
tribes involved, two in Southwest Africa and thirty in East Africa, can also be an influential 
variable in memorialization. These social and political variables have led to the recent 
prominence of the Herero and Nama atrocities receiving critical attention in the past two 
decades, while the events in German East Africa have remained largely out of the limelight.  
 The history of the Herero and Nama peoples in southwest Africa before the German 
occupation of the region is one of conflict and tension. The region that would become known as 
Southwest Africa, or Hereroland, under German occupation, was originally inhabited not by the 
Herero or Nama, but by the San and Mountain Damara peoples.2 The Bantu ancestors of the 
Herero soon grew in power in central Namibia throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
increasingly marginalizing the indigenous populations. Through the next century, the Herero had 
become the leading power in central Namibia.3 This increase in power led to a transition in 
Herero society, away from horticulture to the establishment of vast cattle herds.4 
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Herero people populated what is today 
central Namibia. The population totaled around 80,000 people. The Nama was a smaller tribe of 
                                                          
2 William Parsons, Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Account (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), 92. 
3 Ibid., 93. 
4 Ibid. 
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20,000 individuals.5 The Nama inhabited the lands south of the Herero and had arrived in the 
area in the mid-nineteenth century as they escaped the violence of the Boers in South Africa. The 
Herero and Nama tribes would fight against each other many times; their conflict in 1880 led to 
German occupation.6  
  The Germans had established missionary outposts in the area of southwest Africa in the 
1840s. However, German colonialism did not take hold until forty years later.7 In late 1881, the 
Germans sent officials to explore ore deposits in the area and in 1882 a German merchant, Adolf 
Luderitz, acquired a land holding near the coast.8 Luderitz purchased this piece of land for 2,500 
deutsche marks, two-hundred rifles, and a selection of toys.9 In April 1884, German Chancellor 
Otto von Bismark indicated that he wanted full German control over the entire area, planning to 
use the region of southwest Africa as a stepping stone for entry into the interior of the 
continent.10 The land acquired by Germany was immense, over 360,000 square miles; it was 
composed of 200,000 Africans—Herero, Nama, and Ovambo (the northernmost, and largest, 
tribe).11 Soon after Germans began arriving in the mid-1880s, their prospective rule was soon 
hampered.  The colonizers were not able to legitimatize their claims to power due to the lack of 
savagery among the natives, and the fact that both tribes were nomadic. 12  Additionally, German 
colonization of Namibia was stunted by a lack of investment and resources. 13  
                                                          
5 Horst Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 17.  
6 Ibid., 21.  
7 Ibid., 19 
8 Ibid., 21. This piece of land was located along the coast of a bay that would later honor the explorer, being named Luderitz Bay. 
9 Robert Gaudi, African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914-1918 (London: Penguin, 
2017), 73. 
10 Bismarck’s proposed route to the Upper Congo came about as a result of his failed negotiations with King Leopold II of 
Belgium to sell his colonial holdings in the Congo. Ibid., 26. 
11 Isabel V. Hull Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 8. 
12 A. Dirk Mose, ed,. Empire, Colony, and Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 199. 
13 Ibid. 
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 Despite initial difficulties, German officials, including Chancellor von Caprivi, pushed 
for further control: “We possess South-West Africa once and for all; it is German territory and 
must be preserved as such.”14 As German immigrants came into the region, they soon found 
themselves outnumbered and isolated. The colonizers sheltered behind a number of protective 
treaties signed between the German colonial administration and the local tribes. Between 1884 
and 1885, the German government negotiated with the Herero leadership and eventually came to 
an agreement. These treaties marked the beginning of settler expansion and systematic 
expropriation of African tribal land. By 1888, German holdings in the area reached 835,000 
square miles.15 The 1890s saw a new colonial governor, Theodor Leutwein, lead further 
expansion efforts. He also formed a partnership with the chief of the Herero tribe, Samuel 
Maherero, during the tribe’s conflict with the Nama. Using this relationship, the Germans further 
increased their land holdings.16   
With the Herero tribespeople under increasing pressure from an influx of German settlers 
onto their territory, and an epidemic of rinderpest, which decimated Herero cattle stocks, 17 
tensions began to rise. Despite the German government’s promises in the “protection” treaties it 
had signed in the 1890s, by 1904 many believed that the colonial administrators were not 
respecting the tribe’s customs or habits.18 The spark that would ignite these tensions occurred on 
January 12, 1904 in the town of Okahandja, in the central region of the colony. This town had a 
large population of Herero and was home to Paramount Chief Samuel Maherero. On January 10, 
the German officer in command of the city, Lieutenant Ralph Zurn, was given information by a 
                                                          
14 Reginald Herbold Green, Namibia: The Last Colony (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Press, 1982), 1.  
15 Gaudi, African Kaiser, 73.  
16 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 112. 
17 Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 83.  
18 Ibid., 133. This sentiment can be documented in the 1/7 rule: 7 Herero were needed when testifying against a white individual. 
Furthermore, the Herero felt that the colonial legal system had failed them in their acquittal of rapists. 
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Boer trader who reported that he had seen a large column of 300 armed Herero heading for the 
town two days prior.19 The soldiers and civilians held themselves up in the local fortress for two 
days. Upon receiving a further report of a large number of tribal warriors, 20 German soldiers 
began to fire upon the Herero.21 The violence had begun.   
After Okahandja, the Herero successfully managed to capture all of Hereroland and laid 
siege to fortified towns in the area. The tribe also managed to capture a majority of German 
livestock and killed 126 German settlers.22 Reports of settlers being caught on farms, or captured 
soldiers being killed in horrible fashions, including being buried alive or cannibalized, permeated 
the newspapers of not just Germany but the world.23 This killing of settlers alarmed Berlin, 
which immediately sent reinforcements.24 
 By April 9, 1904, Leutwein and the German forces had successfully advanced to the 
mountains—their march supported by Nama scouts who fought with the Germans against the 
Herero. After a subsequent defeat by the Herero, the German government replaced Leutwein 
with a commander they thought would be more effective: Lothar von Trotha.25 General von 
Trotha was a natural choice to lead the response to the uprising, having served during the East 
African Wahehe Uprising in 1894, as well as in the Boxer Rebellion in China, gaining notoriety 
                                                          
19 David Olusoga and Capser Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of 
Nazism (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), 124.  
20 Ibid., 125. In reality, the large number of Herero tribesmen were there because of a gathering of the northern Herero clans to 
seek arbitration from the paramount chief. 
21 Ibid., 127. The Herero had a long, personal history with Lt. Zurn. At the end of 1903, Zurn summoned Herero leaders from the 
northern portion of Hereoland to a meeting at the fort in Okahandja. There he demanded that they sign a contract that transferred 
large tracks of land to German authorities and establish a Herero reservation. The chiefs refused and Zurn had them forcibly 
removed from his office. He then forged their signatures thinking they could not write despite the fact that several could. In 
December 1903, he announced the new boundaries of central and northern Hereroland, infuriating the leadership of the Herero 
tribe.   
22 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 144. 
23 The Independent Vol 56. Issue 2879, New York Feb 4, 1904. 
24 Olusoga and Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 132.  
25 Ibid., 137-138.  
6 
 
for his violent tactics.26 The General arrived on June 11, 1904, and immediately began setting 
about a new, chilling policy regarding the Herero. In an exchange with Governor Leutwein, von, 
Trotha stated that he “shall destroy the rebellious tribes by shedding rivers of blood and 
money.”27 
General von Trotha began to plan for a final, decisive battle to end the Herero threat to 
the colony. Nearly 50,000 Herero, including 2,500 to 3,000 warriors, were held up at a mountain 
known as the Waterberg, and it was there that von Trotha planned for a decisive battle. General 
von Trotha felt a need to end the rebellion and annihilate the Herero , as he believed that if the 
Herero were not wiped out, that a resurgence of their social customs would occur and lead to 
further bloodshed for years to come.28 In his directives issued on August 4, 1904, von Trotha laid 
out his plans for the attack. From troop placement, the goal of the Germans was to drive the 
surviving Herero into the desert.29 A report from the Colonial German Command said as much: 
“If, however, the Herero were to break through…the enemy would then seal his own fate, 
doomed to die of thirst in the arid sandveld.”30  
After two days of heavy fighting at the mountain that began on August 11, 1904, the 
Herero fled. This flight followed the Germans’ tactical plan perfectly, with the Herero warriors, 
and civilians breaking through the small German contingent to the southwest and retreating into 
the desert.31 Despite the defeat and flight of the Herero, the violence was only just beginning. 
Soon after fleeing the Waterberg, Herero numbers began to dwindle due to starvation and thirst, 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 154.  
28 Tilman Dedering, “The German-Herero War of 1904: Revisionism of Genocide or Imaginary Historiography?” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 19, no. 1 (March 1993): 84. 
29Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 155. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 156.  
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the few watering holes not enough to ensure the survival of all the refugees.32 On August 13, von 
Trotha gave the command for the German forces to pursue the Herero into the desert.33  He 
ordered the military to establish a 155 square mile cordon around the region to ensure that no 
Herero escaped. In a letter von Trotha stated his objectives for this new campaign:  
I believe that the nation should be annihilated…This will be possible in the water 
holes from Grootfontein to Gobabis which are occupied… My intimate 
knowledge… has convinced me of the necessity that the Negro does not respect 
treaties, but only brute force.34 
 From August to September, the German military chased the Herero from watering hole 
to watering hole, with many old, ill, women, and children killed as they ran for their lives.35 
During this pursuit, von Trotha’s incessant racism, coupled with his soldiers’ lack of training and 
frustration at their lack of success against the Herero, led to widespread atrocities and massacres 
occurring throughout this brutal campaign.36  Jan Cloete, a Herero survivor of the campaign, 
recounted that “the Germans set off in pursuit of the rest [of the Herero], and all those found by 
the wayside and in the sandveld were shot down or bayoneted.”37 This pursuit continued until 
early October, when the chase reached its geographical limits and the Germans, exhausted and 
hungry, came to a halt.38  
 Finally, in October, the war against the Herero would take a genocidal turn, with the 
issuing of General von Trotha’s infamous “annihilation order” on October 2, 1904. 
I, the great general of the German soldiers, send this letter to the Hereros. The 
Hereros are German subjects no longer. They have killed, stolen, cut off the ears 
and other parts of the body of wounded soldiers, and now are too cowardly to 
                                                          
32 Parsons, Centuries of Genocide, 91. 
33 Olusoga and Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, 146.  
34 Jan Bart-Gewald, “Herero Genocide in the 20th Century: Politics and Memory,” in Rethinking Resistance: revolt and violence 
in African history, ed. M.E.Bruijn (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003), 284. 
35 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 46.  
36 Isabel Hull, “The Measure of Atrocity: The German War Against the Hereros,” GHI Bulletin, no. 39 (Fall 2005): 42.  
37 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 158. 
38 Ibid. 
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want to fight any longer. I announce to the people that whoever hands me one of 
the chiefs shall receive 1,000 marks, and 5,000 marks for Samuel Maherero. The 
Herero nation must now leave the country. If it refuses, I shall compel it to do so 
with the 'long tube' (cannon). Any Herero found inside the German frontier, with 
or without a gun or cattle, will be executed. I shall spare neither women nor 
children. I shall give the order to drive them away and fire on them. Such are my 
words to the Herero people.39  
The German general no longer saw submission as acceptable, only the disappearance of the 
Herero nation as a whole.40 To make it seem somewhat humane, von Trotha issued a 
supplemental order to his proclamation regarding women and children:  
And the shooting of women and children is to be understood to mean that one can 
shoot over them to force them to run faster. I diffidently mean that the order will 
be carried out and that no male prisoners will be taken… but that it should not 
degenerate into killing women and children.41 
The General’s intention for shooting over the heads of women and children, while 
seemingly positive, meant those that were not simply shot on sight would be forced back into the 
desert to die slow, painful deaths from starvation, thirst, and exhaustion.42 The government in 
Berlin initially supported the measure; however, German Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow 
vigorously protested the proclamation and ordered an alternative. On December 5, over two 
months after von Trotha issued his policy of annihilation, and after tens of thousands had died in 
the desert, Chief of the German General Staff Alfred von Schliffen ordered von Trotha to pardon 
                                                          
39 Rene Paux, The German Colonies: What is to Become of Them? (London: Wightman, 1918), 16. 
40 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 56. The day of the proclamation’s issue, von Trotha ordered that captured Herero prisoners be 
made to listen to the reading of it. Afterward, he ordered the males hung or shot and the women and children chased back into the 
desert.  
41 Parsons, Centuries of Genocide, 89.  
42 Ibid., 90. 
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all Herero and rescind the order.43 Von Trotha begrudgingly complied and the war against the 
Herero ended soon after.44   
 As the war against the Herero wound down in the fall of 1904, the conflict with the Nama 
to the south began to heat up. Much like the Herero, the systematic expropriation of Nama tribal 
land and cattle and the same sense of an absence of rights underscored the revolt.45 After the 
rebellion of the Herero, however, the Nama feared the atrocities committed against their tribal 
neighbors to the north would soon be visited upon themselves.46 Hendrik Witbooi, the leader of 
the Nama tribe, as early as the 1890s, expressed concerns and sentiments that would, over 12 
years later, drive the Nama to take up arms against the Germans. “The White Men’s laws are 
quite unbearable and intolerable to us Red [Nama] people: they oppress us and hem us in in all 
kinds of ways and on all sides.”47  
  The prelude to the ensuing violence occurred on August 30, 1904 when Jakob Morenga, 
a Nama tribal leader, attacked and defeated a German patrol.48 Then, on October 3, 1904, 
Hendrik Witbooi sent a letter to Ludwig Ookopfel stating that he had broken from the 
Germans.49 The tribe initially killed a few German settlers, hoping that it would incentivize the 
colonizers to move off of their lands. However, in response, the German military sent 15,000 
soldiers to fight the estimated 1,000 to 2,000 Nama warriors.50 In the spring of 1905, von Trotha 
                                                          
43 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 64. Most of the German General Staff, including Schliffen, commended von Trotha on his 
genocidal proclamation. However, members of the German Colonial government were appalled by the order, saying in a report 
that the document was “contrary to the principles of Christianity and humanity.”  Heeding this warning, Kaiser Whilhelm asked 
Schliffen to issue and alternative order which resulted in von Trotha’s order being cancelled on December 5, 1904. 
44 George Steinmetz, “The First Genocide of the 20th Century and its Postcolonial Afterlives: Germany and the Namibian 
Ovaherero,” Journal of the International Institute 12, no. 2 (Winter 2005).   
45 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 181.  
46 Ibid., 183.  
47 Hendrik Witbooi, The Hendrik Witbooi Papers (Windhoek: National Archives of Namibia, 1996), 80. 
48 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 180. 
49 Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting, 184. 
50 Ibid., 187.  
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headed south to assume command and, in April, he ordered the Nama to unconditionally 
surrender. They refused and the war devolved into a guerilla war that would last for 18 months.51 
 To defeat the Nama, von Trotha instituted a “scorched-earth” policy, burning villages and 
granaries. These harsh policies, along with atrocities against the Nama similar to what was seen 
with the Herero in the aftermath of the Waterberg, did not end until the fall of 1905. In October 
of that year, Hendrik Witbooi was fatally injured during an attempted raid on a German supply 
convoy.52 With the death of Hendrik Witbooi, the Nama resistance, now unable to unite around a 
central figure, began to break down and soon surrendered.53 The Nama population that was 
captured, and survived, were soon deported to concentration camps being built on the coast, 
where thousands of their former adversaries—the Herero—had been sent.54 When the conflict 
was finally over, and the deaths in the concentration camps had been tallied, 19,000 German 
troops had been mobilized and 1,500 had died. That number pales in comparison to the nearly 
80,000 people—70,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama— who died in the bloodshed. Before the two 
engagements, the tribes’ prewar population totaled around 100,000. 55  
  At the same time that the Herero and Nama genocide was occurring in Southwest 
Africa, in German East Africa another violent campaign against native peoples was underway. 
This rebellion was sparked in the southeastern region of the colony, an area settled by the Ngoni 
people. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ngoni had migrated to present-day southeastern 
Tanzania, due to an upheaval in their native homeland of northeastern South Africa caused by 
                                                          
51 Ibid., 188.   
52 Ibid., 190.  
53 Susanne Kuss, German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2017), 44. 
54 Parsons, Centuries of Genocide, 92.  
55 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 76.  
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environmental crises, the intensification of the slave trade, and the rise of the Zulu nation.56 The 
tribe remained a powerful player in their newly-settled homeland until the latter part of the 
century. 
 In 1884, German colonists arrived in East Africa.57 Despite German arrival in the mid-
1880s, German and Swiss missionaries only began arriving in the region in 1898, with the 
German government still not maintaining control over a large portion of the colony.58 In the mid-
1890s, the Ungoni region—the territory of the Ngoni people—was considered to be one of the 
last frontiers of German rule. The year 1896 saw a number of large-scale tribal raids along the 
coast of Lake Malawi, and attacks against trade caravans. These actions by the Ngoni challenged 
the idea of German supremacy in the colony and called into question Germany’s ability to 
protect subjects, as 2,000 captives had been taken during these attacks.59  In response, the 
fledgling colony sent a contingent of German troops into the area to show tribes that violence 
would not be tolerated.60 The Ngoni people, as well as other tribes in the area, despite German 
threats, continued to resist colonial rule. By the dawn of the new century, German East Africa 
contained nearly 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 inhabitants, yet only 2,000 of those individuals were 
Germans. German authority, therefore, was largely symbolic, upheld though military stations in 
the interior.61 With this lack of manpower and control of vital areas, especially in the southeast, 
coupled with German intentions of increasing their authority in the area, conflict in East Africa 
was inevitable. 
                                                          
56 Heike Schmidt, “(Re)Negotiating Marginality: The Maji Maji War and Its Aftermath in Southwestern Tanzania, ca. 1905-
1916,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 43, no.1 (2010):34. 
57 Schmidt, “(Re) Negotiating Marginality,” 40. 
58 Ibid. 
59 James Giblin and Jamie Monson, eds. Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 191. 
60 Ibid., 192. The Germans showcased their power by shooting through Ngoni warrior shields and killing five tribespeople who 
attempted to flee discussions.  
61 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 138. 
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 Maji, in Kiswahili, means water; it also can mean war medicine. Maji would become a 
key factor in the rebellion in Tanzania. It was through this maji that the seeds of the rebellion in 
German East Africa spread.62 The summer of 1905 saw tribal chiefs all over the region face 
uncertainty and friction from their tribes over the future, as pressures increased under German 
control. Since the colonization of the region, the native tribes had to adapt to a new system of 
taxes imposed by the colonial government, the rise of a plantation economy that used native 
workers and forced labor for public works projects.63 These hardships led to a religious revival 
amongst the tribes of what would become Tanganyika. This revival was led by a prophet named 
Kinjikitile Ngwale. Ngwale, a medicine man, offered tribal leaders sacred water which would 
release them from the restrictions of existing beliefs and superstitions by giving them a new and 
freer life.64 Ngwale’s words spread amongst various tribes in the Southern Highlands of East 
Africa, along with the belief that maji could protect tribes from German bullets.65 
 In late July 1905, men from the Nandete tribe approached their chiefs in a cotton field 
which they had been cultivating for the Germans. The two leaders of the Nandete, Ngulumbalyo 
Mandi and Lindimyo Machela, subsequently pulled three plants out of the ground, symbolically 
declaring war upon the colonizers.66 The Maji Maji Rebellion, as it would be known, began 
among the tribes of the southeast, including the Ngoni. The rebellion quickly spread to the 
Southern Highlands, and eventually reached the Matabi hills in the central eastern part of the 
colony. From there it rapidly spread north, south, northwest, and southwest.67 The rebellion 
spread through messengers who carried word of rebellion, along with maji. At first, tribes 
                                                          
62 Schmidt, “(Re)Negotiating Marginality,” 27. 
63 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 138. 
64 Patrick M. Redmond, The Politics of Power in Sonega Ngoni Society, 1860-1962 (Franklin Square, NY: Adams Press, 1985), 
118. 
65 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 138. 
66 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 168. 
67 Schmidt, “(Re)Negotiating Marginality,” 41. 
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attacked German representatives—mainly tax collectors— plus supply caravans and Arab 
foreign traders.68 After the symbolic declaration of the rebellion, the Germans immediately sent 
additional reinforcements into the region. Colonial Governor Gustav Adolf von Gotzen only had 
588 askari (native African soldiers) and 458 “law enforcement officers” in the region when the 
uprising began. Gotzen ordered the reinforcement troops to advance into the region; however, 
the troops were subjected to frequent ambushes by tribespeople. Lieutenant Lincke, a German 
colonial officer on an expedition to Matumbi, reported “that an unusual morale animated the 
attackers.”69 
 The Germans initially attempted to quell the rebellion by destroying its leadership. 
Almost immediately after the rebellion began, the shooting of those suspected of being rebel 
leaders became military policy. German naval officer von Paasche described such a situation: 
At the suggestion of Keudel [a local administrator] Capt. Merker arrived and 
proclaimed a state of war so that he could immediately hold a court-martial and 
hang three main magicians [rebel leaders], whom Keudel feared might be freed.70  
As part of this campaign by the Germans, Ngwale was hanged on August 4. As he 
prepared to die, he gave an ominous warning: the medicine had already reached the  
Kilosa and Mahenge, districts in central East Africa.71 By July 30, 1905, the rebellious 
tribes had sacked German settlements, and on July 31, burned the important trading town 
of Samanga. Additionally, on August 13, Ngindo warriors from southern Tanzania 
intercepted Benedictine missionaries and shot them dead, as they tried to explain that 
they were peaceful.72 News of the killings soon spread north across Rufiji River and into 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 171. 
70 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 146. 
71 Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 172. 
72 Ibid. 
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the region neighboring Dar es Salaam—the capital of the colony. In this district, the 
Zaramo tribe received the maji in late August and rebelled soon after. The rebellion had 
reached the doorstep of the colonial government.  This, coupled with the burnings of the 
villages of Nyangao and Masani in late August and the killings of the Benedictine 
missionaries, led the colonial government to take further action.73 
These burnings convinced Governor Gotzen that force needed to be used. He sent 
limited forces into the interior; however, throughout August, the tribes were able to 
defeat and turn back German soldiers.74 In response to these defeats, Governor Gotzen 
asked the Reichstag for reinforcements of 150 German soldiers and 600 askari—native 
African soldiers. The government refused the request, but sent two cruisers and marines 
from China and the Pacific to Dar es Salaam.75 
 In the late summer and early fall of 1905, the progress of the rebels slowed and grew to a 
stalemate as they were defeated in battle and other native tribes did not take maji.76 After a 
particularly gruesome battle that saw askari defeated by Ngindo warriors and resulted in the 
askaris’ heads being spiked onto flag poles, the Germans formed a force of 60 men to respond to 
the violence. After a pitched battle, these 60 German soldiers prevailed, killing 150 adversaries 
with their modern weapons.77 Additionally, in late August 1905, another German expedition 
travelled to Songea, a town in the southwest. Upon their arrival, the forces of 56 colonial askari 
and auxiliaries surprised the local chief as he was handing out maji to 500 warriors who were 
armed with spears. In the ensuing battle, 200 warriors were killed; only one colonial soldier was 
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killed.78 After these defeats, the tribes began to question the efficacy of the “medicine” that was 
meant to protect them from German bullets.  
On August 30, 1905, the failure of maji became clear. On that date, 1,200 warriors 
advanced on the town of Mahenge, which was occupied by the Germans. The attack on the 
village came in three waves: the first was a full-frontal assault against German machine guns, 
which resulted in many deaths. The second occurred when warriors, now recognizing the failure 
of the maji, broke formation and took cover behind rocks; the third and final wave occurred after 
warriors from the Mbunga tribe arrived on September 1. They sent forward a single man while 
thousands watched. He was shot and killed soon after.79  
The battle at Mahenge exposed the failure of the maji on the battlefield. As a result of the 
defeat, the tribes began to revert back to native combat methods. In September 1905, the 
Germans began receiving reports of increasing guerilla activity. “Hardly any day passes without 
some combat small and large,” a German soldier reported.80 These guerilla activities increased in 
frequency, as natives resorted to using traditional weapons.81 On October 21, 1905 the rebellious 
tribes blockaded the town of Namabengo in southeastern East Africa. This blockade was lifted 
when 200 colonial reinforcements arrived and dispersed the 5,000 warriors with machine guns.82 
After the defeat, the warriors all fled in different directions, their intertribal unity broken. This 
battle officially marked a shift from the previous tactics of raiding utilized by the tribes to 
guerilla-style warfare.83  
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 Between November 1905 and January 1906 sporadic fighting continued. This  began to 
decrease as many tribes started to surrender, leaving few pockets of resistance.84 At the same 
time, Governor von Gotzen reviewed options to end the rebellion once and for all. The 
Waggenhiem report proposed that “only hunger and want can bring about a final submission. 
Military action alone will remain more or less a drop in the ocean.”85 In early 1906, Major Kurt 
Johannes arrived with fresh reinforcements, and Governor Gotzen, heeding the words of the 
Waggenhiem report, began to plan for a new, destructive strategy: famine.  Gotzen, after the 
arrival of fresh soldiers, proclaimed that the “military leadership has no other alternative than to 
use this ally—famine.”86 The Governor immediately instructed the Major to implement a 
counterinsurgency campaign which would result in the destruction and confiscation of all food 
and supplies and show no mercy to the native population.87  
The famine order culminated in the burning of fields and homes during planting seasons; 
the holding of women and children hostage to get rebellious male warriors to surrender; and the 
captured warriors being assigned to forced labor, with tribal leaders being executed.88 A German 
captain, Richter, commenting on the policy of famine: “That’s right, the fellows can just 
starve…If I could I would even prevent them from planting anything. This is the only way we 
can make the fellows sick of war.”89 Furthermore, a military report from the commander of the 
German naval forces in East Africa stated that the rebels would be forced “to a lasting 
capitulation through permanent harassment, destruction of their villages, and removal of 
livestock and food stores.”90 As the famine strategy wore on, former militants reported that 
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conditions amongst the tribes had become dire. One warrior said, “We had no stronghold, no 
place to stay in to do this or that.” Hunger further affected the native war effort, as warriors 
became more focused on finding food than fighting. In one instance, an ambush was averted by 
German soldiers when tribal warriors went out to pick bananas on the side of the road and were 
spotted.91 The “scorched-earth” campaign finally ended the rebellion in 1907. The two-year 
rebellion and subsequent famine devastated the whole southern part of the colony and led to an 
estimated 250,000 to 300,000 deaths, around one-third of the total population of the region.92 
Meanwhile, the death toll for the colonial government stood at 15 German soldiers, 73 askari, 
and 215 auxiliaries.93  
Connections to the Holocaust 
These two tragedies occurred over 100 years ago; however, in recent years, the rebellion 
of the Herero and Nama in Namibia has become much more prominent. One of the reasons of 
this renewed interest is the rebellions’ structural and personal connections to the Holocaust. One 
simple connection is that both of these events were genocides; the Herero and Nama event now 
being considered the first genocide of the twentieth century. Characteristics of the genocide in 
Southwest Africa included the willingness and acceptance of mass death—by colonial officials 
like Governor Leutewin and General von Trotha, the destruction of native culture, and extremist 
language from the Germans. Comparatively, in the German East African rebellions, while the 
numbers of dead were substantially higher - 250,000 in German East Africa compared to 80,000 
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in Southwest Africa, there is no evidence in German East Africa that the military or colonial 
officials in the colony willingly sought the destruction of the 30 tribes in active rebellion. 
An acceptance of mass casualties was established early after the rebellion of the Herero 
had begun in 1905. After being questioned by the Director of the Colonial Department Dr. Oskar 
Stuebel on the nature of the fighting, Governor von Leutwein said, “It is only natural, however, 
that after all that has happened to our soldiers [they] do not show excessive leniency.”94 When it 
came to dealing with the Nama, the Germans resorted to using cruel and violent tactics in 
pursuing a small band of Nama renegades led by Joseph Morenga. A colonist, Richard Denker, 
reported that German troops had captured 50 women and 38 children and, lacking proper 
transport to prison facilities and having gotten no useful information from them, the colonial 
soldiers shot all of them. Upon seeing this tragedy, Denker reportedly said, “I am ashamed to be 
a German.”95 After von Trotha issued his annihilation order, which showed an intent to destroy 
the Herero as an ethnic group, he issued the additional order regarding women and children, 
ordering that soldiers shoot over their heads in order to scare them off. However, when prisoners 
began to be captured, von Trotha issued yet another, more chilling, order regarding women and 
children. In a letter of von Schlieffen on October 4, 1904, von Trotha stated the new measures 
put in place to prevent the capture of prisoners.  
Accepting women and children who are ill pose an imminent danger to the 
troops…Therefore, I think it better the nation perish rather than infect our troops 
and affect our water and food.96 
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Thus, Von Trotha justified the deaths of unarmed women and children because they posed a 
potential threat to the health of his soldiers. At this point in the rebellion, after the battle of the 
Waterberg and the desert pursuit, he saw extermination, not surrender, as the only way forward.97 
 The openness of using tactics that caused mass death was one that led to the physical 
extermination of tens of thousands of Herero and Nama people; however, the conflict also saw 
the destruction of tribal culture. Herero tribal lands were a place where “places of meaning” such 
as graves, waterholes, and events of historical significance took place.98  The Herero viewed the 
land as a place where memories and meaning were inscribed on the land itself from previous 
generations, acting as mnemonic devices for cultural history and identity.99 However, during the 
era of German colonialism, the land was lost by means of physical and cultural expropriation. 
Germans renamed the Herero’s sacred and significant places, thus these places lost their 
significant cultural meanings. Additionally, the destruction of Herero villages and the restriction, 
or outright banning, of the Herero cultural traditions of owning cattle and pastoral nomadism 
destroyed activities central to the tribe’s cultural and socio-economic traditions.100  The Germans 
also executed, or killed in battle, nearly all of the Herero chieftainship and deported their 
surviving family members. These chiefs represented a cornerstone of Herero society and cultural 
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tradition.101 The deaths of the whole tribal leadership significantly weakened the group’s 
economic, political, and social institutions.102 
 This intentional annihilation and genocide of a people was further propagated by 
concentration camps, similar to those utilized in the genocide carried out by the Third Reich 
nearly 40 years later. As the campaign against the Herero continued into 1905, the establishment 
of prisoner-of-war camps became a military necessity. While small, temporary prison camps had 
been in use since the winter of 1904, the spring of 1905 saw the establishment of four main 
concentration camps to hold tribal prisoners: Windhoek, Shark Island, Okahandja, and 
Swakopmund.103 When captured, Herero and Nama prisoners automatically fell under the 
military authority of area commanders who were responsible for caring for the prisoners under 
their control. At a time when many German soldiers lacked basic supplies, this proved to be a 
difficult responsibility. In January 1905, General von Trotha issued guidance regarding the 
treatment of prisoners, which stated that priority would be given to the needs of his own troops, 
and that the needs of the tribal prisoners would be addressed only after military needs had been 
satisfied.104 This rigid maintenance of military policy regarding provisioning would have 
disastrous consequences for the Herero and Nama captured and imprisoned for the next three 
years. 
Eventually, this guidance devolved from prisoners not taking priority, to active 
mistreatment, cruelty, torture, rape and countless deaths in concentration camps. As the war 
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progressed, many thousands of tribespeople would meet similar fates in the concentration camps. 
After taking command over the Herero revolt, General von Trotha established principles for 
imprisonment that defined how prisoners-of-war were treated in the concentration camps. Under 
these policies, the local officer capturing the prisoners would be given the authority to determine 
how to transport them; security was to be kept at an absolute minimum, necessitating the usage 
of chains and other inhumane devices; and the Herero were to be kept visibly and permanently 
identified with tin passes around their necks.105 Nama prisoners were originally meant to be 
deported to the German colonies of Somoa and Adamauna, as Colonel von Deimling, the 
commander of the German Schutztruppe, German soldiers in the colony, believed the tribe posed 
a greater security risk than the Herero due to the recent escape of the surviving Witbooi soldiers 
from custody.106 However, the high cost of transport killed this idea of deportation and instead 
the Nama were to be sent to prison camps along the coast, mainly Shark Island.107 
Many prisoners, upon their capture, were taken to collection camps where they were 
sorted by their level of health. The sick were sent to concentration camps while the healthier 
individuals were sent to labor camps.108 However, even transporting prisoners proved to be a 
major problem. The German government had refused to subsidize the costs of prisoners due to 
their belief, much like von Trotha’s, that military resources should not be burdened by caring for 
prisoners. The government did institute a tax to help pay for prisoner costs; however, its effects 
were negligible.109 This ideology had tragic consequences. Benjamin Burger, a Dutch South 
African serving as a guide for the Schutztruppe, bore witness to the surprise attack and 
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subsequent capture of Nama prisoners. German soldiers, Burger said, had found a group of 13 
women and elderly men in a cave and ordered them to come out and surrender. As they came 
out, the Germans shot all of them as they exited. The commanding officer in charge ordered the 
deaths of these prisoners in order to avoid having to escort them back to a holding camp and 
wasting time and resources in the process.110 
By April 1905, the colonial government was in possession of 4,000  prisoners, a number 
that would balloon to 13,216 by December of that year.111 The locations of the concentration 
camps at Shark Island, Swakopmund, and Windhoek, made death an easy proposition for 
arriving prisoners. The commanders of these prison camps had been given orders that they were 
not to help the sick upon arrival, only those able-bodied and healthy, so labor could be supplied 
for the various infrastructure projects in the colony.112 Missionary Heinrich Ledder visited the 
camp at Swakopmund in early March 1905 and was shocked at the conditions. The camp was 
located along the coast and, during the months of April to October, was subjected to cold, harsh 
winds whipping off the sea. He said of the occupants, “Some of them had been starved to 
skeletons…In the settlements they were placed into big kraals [huts]…without blankets, and 
some without clothing.”113 The prisoners at the camp were crammed 30 to 40 into simple huts 
made from sticks with simple canvas cloth roofs that did little to protect them from the winds. 
Supplies, due to von Trotha’s distaste at allocating military resources for prisoners, were 
extremely scarce at the camp. Ledder reported that there were only 80 blankets to protect the 
over 1,200 people imprisoned at the camp. He also reported that the prisoners could not eat 
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sufficiently since they had no cookware to cook the uncooked rice they were allotted.114 Henry 
Francis Walker, upon visiting the remains of the camp 10 years later, would describe it as having 
“the most miserable habitations imaginable.”115 Medical facilities at the camp, while officially 
provided, were relegated to a cramped space located near animal stables and sewage lines.116 The 
two prison camps at Windhoek held over 5,000 prisoners by mid-August 1906. These two 
camps, as with Swakopmund, were very small and had frequent, deadly outbreaks of disease 
epidemics. These two camps used barbed-wire or thick bushels of thorn bushes to keep prisoners 
contained in these small spaces.117  
It was the concentration camp at Luderitz Bay, located on the aptly named Shark Island, 
which would become infamous for its suffering. The camp, established in March 1905, was 
where many Herero and nearly all captured Nama were sent. Located on the northern tip of the 
island, the camp was exposed to the cold winds and weather from the South Atlantic at their 
most extreme.118 The environment proved fatal for many prisoners-of-war. The Herero and 
Nama peoples had historically been located inland, away from the coast, for much of their 
existence, and many tribespeople had never set foot near the coast during their entire lives. Their 
bodies were not acclimated to cold climates, only that of the dry, warm interior of the colony.119 
Additionally, Shark Island contained no actual buildings, with prisoners being given a few 
surplus, or broken, military tents, and others making shelters with spare blankets to protect them 
from the constant wind.120 
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 General Lothar von Trotha’s continual resistance to allocate more money to the camps 
had a particularly devastating effect at Shark Island. From September to December 1906, of the 
1,795 Herero and Nama imprisoned at the camp, 1,032 would die of exposure, disease, or 
starvation.121 In December 1906, after the death of 276 of the 1,464 Nama that month, the 
commander of the camp, Colonel Deimling, received numerous complaints from missionaries 
regarding the horrid conditions of the prisoners. After asking the commandant to remove the 
women and children from the camp in order to save their lives, Deimling jokingly replied, “It 
hadn’t occurred to me that there are actually more women than men in there.”122 The large 
female population at the camp led to many instances of German soldiers sexually assaulting and 
raping female prisoners. Many of these rapes went unreported and were not taken to court, with 
few exceptions.123  
Lack of and contaminated food became a common source of death amongst the Nama 
located on Shark Island. The ideal daily nutritional intake for prisoners was 1,190 calories, which 
was frequently adjusted downward and given only when available.124 With rations consisting 
mainly of grains, rice and flour, many of the prisoners had no idea how to prepare or cook such 
foods. This forced diet of high fiber foods contrasted, many times fatally, with the traditional diet 
of milk and meat that tribal people were accustomed to consuming from their large stocks of 
cattle.125 Edward Fredricks, the son of Chief Joseph Fredericks, the leader of the Bethany Nama 
tribe, was captured and sent to Shark Island as a prisoner. He described being beaten daily by 
Germans with sjamboks—leather whips—and women being violated by German guards on a 
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regular basis. Fredericks tallies the number of his tribespeople who died on Shark Island at 168 
males, 97 women, and 66 children.126  Fritz Issac, another prisoner of the camp on Shark Island, 
mentioned that of the 3,500-member prisoner party he was sent with, only 193 survived the first 
year on Shark Island; over 3,300 had died.127 
A 1908 report from the Schutzruppe Command showed that a total of 17,000 Herero and 
Nama were taken as prisoners-of-war between 1904 and 1907. Out of this total, the report 
estimates that 7,682 of those imprisoned, 45 percent, died. However, modern scholars consider 
those numbers to be inaccurate and estimate the following numbers are more precise: 33,000 
tribespeople were taken prisoner and 17,000 or 51 percent, died in the camps.128 In total, owing 
to a spike in mortality rates in 1906, 61 percent of prisoners at the two camps in Windhoek did 
not survive imprisonment. At the Okahandja camp, the death rate was lower, at 37 percent. 
However, the camps at Swakopmund and Shark Island became places of death for Herero and 
Nama prisoners sent to them. At Swakopmund, between 1904 and 1907, 74 percent of prisoners 
died. Those numbers would be superseded by the dead at Shark Island: 86 percent of the Herero 
prisoners and 223% of the total Nama prisoners died on the small island of rock in Lüderitz 
Bay.129 
In addition to the intent to target and annihilate ethnic groups and the use of 
concentration camps, extremist language and institutionalized racism marked the third aspect of 
the genocide in Namibia that connects it, structurally, to the Aryan race rhetoric of the Nazis in 
the 1930s and 1940s. After the rebellion had begun in 1904, false reports of barbaric atrocities 
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committed by the Herero began to be reported in newspapers around the world. News 
organizations in Germany widely reported stories of German soldiers being gruesomely killed by 
savage tribespeople, which were also reprinted in the United States. The New York Independent 
reported in February 1904 that families caught on farms had been horribly slain, including 
cannibalization, and that captured soldiers were being tortured and buried alive by the marauding 
bands of Herero warriors.130 These false claims increased the violence visited upon the Herero 
warriors and prisoners, and also may explain German atrocities and acceptance of mass death 
and the inherent institutionalized racism as well.  
 The year 1905 saw the passage of a law banning rassenmischung, race-mixing, in the 
colony. The law in Namibia was a catalyst for similar laws in German East Africa the following 
year and Samoa seven years later.131 The race laws of German Southwest Africa provided a 
conceptual basis that would later be applied by Nazi lawmakers to draft the 1935 Defense Law, 
which prohibited soldiers from marrying non-Aryan peoples, as well as the infamous Nuremberg 
Laws.132 Furthermore, in 1908, after the end of the Herero and Nama revolts, legislation ordered 
that all Africans over the age of eight-years-old had to wear tin passes embroidered with the 
imperial crown, district area, and labor number.133 These tin passes bear a resemblance to the 
identification patches worn by victims of the Holocaust four decades later.  
 Extreme language also permeated the conflict in the colony. As has already been seen, 
members of the colonial government used extremist language when referring to their policy 
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goals or their thoughts on the native peoples. General von Trotha, before arriving in the colony, 
used Social Darwinism to explain his racist feelings regarding the Herero: “At the onset we 
cannot do without the natives. But they will finally have to melt away…philanthropic views 
cannot banish Darwin’s law survival of the fittest.” 134 In 1906, Captain Maximillian Rayer said 
that God ordained the destruction of the Nama. A year later, government official Paul Rohrbach 
argued that the Nama had no use economically, like the Herero had; therefore there was “no 
justification for the preservation of this race.”135 
 Medical experimentation in the prisoner-of-war camps of Southwest Africa is also yet 
another structural link between Namibia and Nazi Germany. At the camp on Shark Island, the 
camp’s doctor, Dr. Bofiger, attempted to find the source of the high death rate amongst 
prisoners, as well as try to cure scurvy in the camp. To attempt this, the doctor performed a 
number of experiments on live prison subjects in which he injected them with various 
substances, including arsenic and opium, to find a cure— which he never did.136 There were also 
reports that Herero prisoners were forcibly sterilized and injected with doses of smallpox, 
typhus, and tuberculosis.137 Eugen Fischer, a German anthropologist who became an influential 
figure for race science, developed and tested racial hygiene theories in Southwest Africa. Using 
captured prisoners as experiments, Fischer tested, and subsequently allegedly confirmed, using 
physical measurements, his theories that genetic racial mixing between Germans and Africans 
was dangerous.138 
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 The structural connections between the Herero and Nama genocide and the Holocaust are 
striking: intent to annihilate, concentration camps, extremist language and institutionalized 
racism, and medical experiments on live prisoners; however, within the past decade, a literature 
has formed linking these events in Namibia at the turn of the twentieth century to the Holocaust 
by way of individual, personal connections. In the aftermath of both the Herero and Nama 
rebellions, as well as World War I, and during the socialist uprisings in Germany in the 1920s, 
many veterans of the colonial wars formed Freikorps—free army—units to fight against socialist 
groups.139 General Ludwig von Maercer, having served in German Southwest Africa and having 
overseen prisoners at Shark Island, formed the first Freikorps unit to crush the revolutionary 
uprising in Munich.140 Several men who would become influential in the Third Reich held 
positions in the unit, including a young Reinhard Heydrich.141 Other influential members of the 
future Nazi regime included Paul Emil von Lettowvorbek, Franz Ritter von Epp, Eugen Fischer, 
and Herman Goering.  
 Paul Emil von Lettowvorbeck, a veteran of the war in Namibia, formed his own 
Freikorps unit and suppressed the Communists in Berlin during the violence in 1919. 
Lettowvorbeck served at the battle of the Waterberg alongside another future Nazi, Franz Xavier 
Ritter von Epp. Members that served in Lettowvorbeck’s unit included Wilhelm Stukart, who 
would go on to become a Nazi lawyer who would draft the Nuremberg Laws. Lettowvorbeck’s 
aide-de-camp was Ernst Rohm, Hitler’s future right-hand-man and driving force behind the Nazi 
Brown Shirts.142 
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Franz Xavier Ritter von Epp arrived in Southwest Africa in 1904 as one of the first 
reinforcements sent to put down the revolt, holding the position as a company commander.  He 
fought at the Waterberg and was stationed in the colony until 1906.143 After World War I, von 
Epp became commander of the Bavarian Freikorps, who generally despised the Weimar 
Republic and wanted the reestablishment of the monarchy.144 During this time, after World War 
I, von Epp became acquainted with Adolf Hitler, installing him as an “educator” in his Freikorps 
unit.145 Von Epp subsequently became a member of the Nazi party and on March 9, 1933, von 
Epp was appointed as a Reich commissioner, on orders from Hitler, to take over the government 
in Munich.146 
As discussed earlier, Eugen Fischer was an influential anthropologist in German 
Southwest Africa during the revolt of the Herero and Nama. During his time in Namibia, Fischer 
studied the Baster people. The Basters were a mixed- race tribe, descended from Nama women 
and Boer men, who lived in a community named Rehoboth. Fischer studied them to show how 
race-mixing led to degeneration of the white race over time. He did this by measuring lengths of 
extremities and heads of Baster people.147 His report, “The Rehobeth Bastards and the 
Basterization Problem in Man,” contained photographs and charts of eyes and hair color to argue 
the problems of race-mixing.148  He subsequently released a joint report entitled “Human 
Heredity and Racial Hygiene.” This study would go on to become the most influential book on 
Nazi race science.149 One of the anthropologist’s most prominent students was Joseph 
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Mengele.150 Adolf Hitler personally received a copy of Fischer’s report while imprisoned in 
Landsburg, where it played a significant role in shaping his views of race and racial purity.151  
Fischer later became director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology from 1927-1942 
152 and would later become a powerful figure in Nazi racial science during the Third Reich.153 
Under Nazi rule, the anthropologist became a judge on the Superior German Health Court, which 
sought to perform studies using black Africans for purposes of exploitation.154 
The final, and perhaps most significant Nazi with connections to the events in Namibia in 
1904-08, was Herman Goering. Goering’s father, Heinrich, served as the Reichkommissionar of 
Southwest Africa between 1884-1891, where he suppressed small revolts and signed treaties that 
subdued African peoples.155 Herman Goering, his son, held his father’s service in Africa in high 
regard, saying that it is how he learned that the subjugation of non-Germans was a patriotic path 
to glory.156 Herman Goering’s official Nazi party biography claimed that his father, and his 
action against the Herero, influenced his son’s character.157 The Third Reich opened a museum 
to Herman Goering in 1940 as a memorial to Germany’s lost empire. This memorial included 
various exhibition halls that contained, among other things, the Nazi flag alongside the flag of 
the Second Reich—the era of the Herero and Nama—and a large portrait of Hitler next to Alfred 
Lüderitz, the founder of German Southwest Africa.158  
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Human Remains 
 The Holocaust had made it possible for anthropologists to acquire body parts from Nazi 
concentration camps, continuing a process that had begun in Southwest Africa.159 With 
connections to individuals performing medical experiments, like Eugen Fischer, who would go 
on to become an influential Nazi member, the Herero and Nama genocide has become a 
“globalized” event, as the physical remains of those who died proliferated around the world. 
After the war against the Herero ended in December 1905, Lt. Ralf Zurn, who was a prominent 
individual in starting the war, was asked by anthropologist Felix von Luschan to bring back 
skulls of dead prisoners to Germany.160 Reports from Germans involved in the process say that 
Herero women were forced to remove the heads of their countrymen with shards of broken 
glass.161 Zoologist Leonard Schultz, on a collecting trip in the colony, said: “I could make use of 
the victims of war… from fresh native corpses, which made a welcome addition to the study of 
the living body.”162 These skulls found their ways into the United States and Germany, leading to 
the Herero and Nama genocide becoming more well-known internationally than the events in 
East Africa. At the American Museum of Natural History in New York City, boxes of human 
skulls and bones remain stored inside the building after Luschan sold his entire private collection 
to the museum.163 These skulls also found their way into the Medical History Museum of the 
Charite hospital in Berlin, which has become a recent center of controversy regarding the 
repatriation of skulls back to Namibia. Since 2008, 20 skulls have been returned to the country so 
far.164 The spread of human remains around the world was a unique characteristic of the tragedy 
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in Namibia, one not seen in the aftermath of the Maji Maji uprising in East Africa, and it led to 
increasing awareness of the genocide in Southwest Africa, in both Germany and the United 
States, as calls for repatriation grew in the first decade of the twenty-first century.  
Political Power: Loss in Tanzania  
The proliferation of human remains globalized the destruction of the Herero and Nama in 
a way that was not seen with the tribes of East Africa. While both tribes in Namibia would be 
repressed in the aftermath of the conflict, the tribes, particularly the Herero, would experience a 
resurgence of political, social, and economic power; however, the same cannot be said of the 30 
tribes that participated in the Maji Maji Uprising in 1905. The memory of that rebellion has 
faded for public view, just as the Herero and Nama genocide had until the past two decades. This 
was due to political events that sought to not only destroy tribal political power but the very 
identity of the rebellion itself: the concept of maji.   
German, and later British, officials saw the cornerstone of the revolt in East Africa, maji, 
as a dangerous form of spiritual and medicinal practice they associated with demonic forces and 
witchcraft. Therefore, after the rebellion, colonial officials believed that witchcraft had the 
potential to lead to another rebellion. Prior to the uprising in 1905, medicinal magic, which 
would soon be termed witchcraft by the Europeans, was practiced by over 100 tribes in the 
region.165 After the rebellion, German officials believed that the waganaga, healers, who 
mobilized villages in a specific region—like what was seen in Maji Maji—could once again 
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threaten the colonial administration with violence.166 To the German colonial government, the 
medicine practiced by these tribes was of a political nature. 
After World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, the region of East Africa, now known 
as Tanganyika, came under the control of the British government. With the changing of 
government, however, the policy towards witchcraft remained unchanged.167 Initially, the British 
colonial government distributed pamphlets regarding the use of witchcraft. These pamphlets did 
not treat witchcraft as a crime, however. Circular No. 15 of April 1919 treated witchcraft as a 
superficial threat, but warned that “the fact should not be lost sight of that witchcraft possessed 
in the past of this country, and still possess possibilities for evil as an incitement to native 
uprisings.”168 This was a clear reference to the Maji Maji rebellion a decade prior. A later 
regulatory pamphlet, Circular No.22, still did not impose punishment for witchcraft, except 
during specific cases of riot incitement.169  
Not until the coming of the first British colonial governor of Tanganyika, Horace Byatt, 
were laws established that punished individuals for practicing witchcraft. The law passed in 
1922, during his tenure as governor, was officially titled, “Ordinance to Provide for the 
Punishment of Persons Practicing Witchcraft or Making Use of So Called Witchcraft.” While the 
law was more expansive than Circular No. 22, covering not just witchcraft used for riot 
incitement, but any form of witchcraft used with “malicious intent,” it still did not ban outright 
the practice of tribal healing.170  
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After Governor Byatt left colonial office in 1922, the incoming Governor of Tanganyika, 
Donald Cameron, proclaimed a major change in the laws regarding witchcraft. Cameron believed 
that the previous witchcraft law of 1922 was useless and set about redefining colonial ordinance 
by expanding and enlarging the scope of punishments for the practice of witchcraft.171 In 1928, 
his administration released a new law that made all practice of witchcraft illegal. The Witchcraft 
Act of December 1928 defined witchcraft to include “sorcery, enchantment, and bewitching.” 
According to the law, an individual was guilty of a crime if they had instruments of witchcraft in 
their possession, had a statement of intent to commit acts of magic, supplied others with 
instruments of witchcraft, advised others on performing the act, or threatened the use of 
magic.172 The punishment for violating the law depended on malicious intent. If a person 
performed witchcraft without malice, they were fined 1,000 shillings; if caught performing the 
act with malicious intent, the punishment was imprisonment for seven years and a 4,000 shilling 
fine.173  
Under British administration, tribal magic was repressed with ruthless efficiency; the 
memory of the rebellion faded as the supernatural beliefs and practices that defined it crumbled 
under increasing colonial scrutiny. The tribes that once practiced such spiritual practices, and 
spearheaded the rebellion in East Africa were accused by many in the government of greed, 
envy, and savage cannibalism.174 These collective groups of peoples, once proud and prominent 
tribes in the region, had become, in the eyes of the colonizers, inhuman demons. In the southern 
part of Tanganyika, witchcraft was openly met with violence.  
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These laws, and actions, against supposed witchcraft would continue well into the 
twentieth century. In the 1950s, the government of Tanganyika pushed for more stringent 
witchcraft eradication methods. In 1954, local town councils were instructed to cleanse districts 
of witchcraft and witches. These actions resulted in the “cure” of 704 people with medicines or 
the surrender of their magical instruments.175 The year 1956 saw a revision of the 1928 
Witchcraft Act. The revision created an official commission to review and asses the state of 
witchcraft in the territory. This committee approved a number of measures, including a vigorous 
educational strategy through law and propaganda, with the intention that such education, and 
spread of modern ideas, would marginalize and end beliefs in witchcraft; the committee also 
allowed for more cleansing actions in some areas of the colony.176 
In 1961, the former colony of Tanganyika declared independence and became the 
Republic of Tanzania. Despite independence, the new government of Tanzania, led by Julius 
Nyerere, did not alter its stance towards witchcraft in the country. The central government and 
Christian and Muslim leaders still did not sanction witchcraft in Tanzania.177  A law passed in 
1965 defined witchcraft to include “sorcery, enchantment, bewitching, the use of instruments of 
witchcraft, the purported exercise of occult power, and the purported possession of any occult 
knowledge.”178 This new law parroted many aspects of the 1928 colonial law regarding 
witchcraft, but expanded the scope of punishment and the circumstances by which a person 
would be committing witchcraft.179  
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The 1970s saw a radical period in the suppression of witchcraft in Tanzania. This era saw 
the federal government institute Operation Mauaji, which rounded up and interrogated nearly 
900 people suspected of being witches and performing witchcraft.180 The 1970s also saw the 
creation of local vigilante organizations to fight against witchcraft: the Sungusungu. The 
Sungusungu were formed in the late 1970s with support from the central government at the end 
of the Ugandan War of 1979.181 The official goal of this group was the re-establishment of 
tranquility in villages by decreasing crime and the eradication of witches.182 These groups, 
particularly in the southern Tanzania, used violence to eradicate witchcraft , often killing the 
elderly, females, and vulnerable individuals.183 Between 1970 and 1984, there were an estimated 
3,333 witch-related cases of murders that killed 3,692 people.184 These groups continued to grow 
and increase their violent activity throughout the 1980s, which led to a contentious debate over 
witchcraft in the 1990s. This debate came to an end at the dawn of the twenty-first century, with 
the passage of the 2002 Witchcraft Act, which continued many of the existing provisions and 
laws from both the 1928 and 1956 laws banning witchcraft.185 
In contemporary Tanzania, the repression of supposed witches and witchcraft is still an 
important concern to the federal government. At present, Tanzania is reluctant, according to the 
World Health Organization, to acknowledge that witchcraft still exists in the country.186 While 
the government has made progress in recent years in combatting witch-killings, maintaining that 
they are illegal and subject to a fine and imprisonment, many officials within local councils 
continue to support the activities of the Sungusungu, and view these actions as pursuing justice 
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or ridding an area of bad luck.187 The central government itself has come under renewed fire for 
actively supporting vigilante activities that kill innocent people suspected of being witches.188 
The persecution of suspected witches has not appeared to slow in recent years as people with 
albinism have been killed at increasing rates, and dismembered, because doctors argue such body 
parts are valuable. As recently as 2011, 600 elderly women were killed in Tanzania on suspicion 
that they were witches.189 
 As witchcraft eradication increased over time, the Maji Maji rebellion faded from public 
view, as its core characteristics, healers and maji, have been deemed witchcraft. During the 
1960s, the uprising was trumpeted by many politicians as a nation-building experience, the first 
event to unite the separate tribes in the area to achieve a common goal; however, as the decades 
have passed, this narrative of the Maji Maji rebellion, one where tribal, ethnic, and religious 
differences did not matter, was proven incorrect by scholars who, studying the evidence, argued 
that the revolt was indeed a tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict.  
During the push for Namibian independence, many political leaders in Tanganyika 
argued that the Maji Maji rebellion was the first example of tribes coming together and 
exhibiting their national unity. This was spurred by a nationalistic interpretation that emphasized 
the strong positive resistance amongst tribes against the German government.190 In a speech at 
                                                          
187 Ibid., 24. 
188 Ibid., 27. The Sunday Observer of May 9, 2004 argued that the government supported the Sangusangu because it was vital for 
community security. To show their support for the groups, the government awarded several for the “best practice in 
implementing local policies for crime prevention.”  
189 Errol Burnett, “Witchcraft in Tanzania: the good, bad, and the persecution,” CNN, October 8, 2012. The article also mentions 
how witchcraft eradication has become a lucrative business, with “doctors” charging $20-$120 for their services. 
190 Katrina Demulling, “We Are One: The Emergence and Development of National Consciousness in Tanzania” (PhD. diss., 
Boston University, 2005), 145-146. For further information regarding the development of the nationalist narratives, and the 
institutions the Tanzanian government used to distort facts in order to do this, see Thaddeus Sunseri, “Statist Narratives and Maji 
Maji Ellipses,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 33, no.3 (2000):567-584.  
38 
 
the United Nations, future Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere voiced these common sentiments 
at the time: 
 
 The people fought because they did not believe in the white man’s right to 
govern and civilize the black. They rose in a great rebellion not through fear of a 
terrorist movement or superstitious oath, but in response to a natural call of the 
spirit, ringing in the hearts of all men, and all times, educated or uneducated, to 
rebel against foreign domination.191  
 
Although the rebellion was widespread throughout the colony, not every locality or tribe 
participated.192 The cause of the rebellion was not, according to historians, a result of German 
oppression, but one of economic power. The geographic spread of the rebellion strongly 
coincided with tribal divisions between trading networks, with tribes centered on a network 
usually joining the rebellion.193 
The Maji Maji was sanctified and extended by religious ideology, particularly by the 
Kolelo cult. This cult, run by ministers, interpreted the orders to rebel as having come from the 
heavens, who then brought these orders and grievances to regular tribespeople.194 The Kolelo 
cult, which had widespread influence over southern Tanzania, was centered in the village of 
Ngarambi on the Rufiji River, and saw many people flock to them from many parts, particularly 
from the south and east, to seek advice and help.195 The cult was also centered in other areas, and 
as a result, provided teachings and instructions to many tribespeople. The Kolelo cult provided a 
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mechanism to reach the people along the Rufiji river.196 Another aspect of the religious character 
of the Maji Maji movement, disputed by the Tanzanian government, was the prophet Kinjikitile 
Ngwale, who effectively turned maji into war medicine, giving the spiritual water a new 
ideological meaning related to war.197   
As religion was a catalyst for the rebellion, tribalization directed action during the latter 
stages of the uprising. As the rebellion entered its second year and progress slowed, many tribes 
recognized the failure of the maji to protect them from the Germans. An example of this 
tribalization was seen in two tribes: the Vidunda and Ngoni. A hongo, a priest, came to the 
Vidunda tribe and informed its members that he was there to free them from European control. 
Tribespeople listened to the priest’s word, over the calls of their chief, Ngwira, and accepted the 
maji and rebelled. The hongo took control of the tribe and increased his power within the district, 
gathering warriors to fight against the Germans. After gathering warriors, he fought, and lost, a 
battle against the colonizers. The warriors soon returned to their tribe and chief, returning to old 
tribal guerilla fighting methods after their loss.198 The Ngoni tribe, at the outbreak of the 
rebellion was divided between northern and southern sections. After both sections accepted the 
maji and rebelled, they operated independently of each other, within the limits of their kinship 
and tribal structures.199 
As the contradictory narratives of the Maji Maji rebellion have led to its isolation from 
political speeches, with mentions of it seemingly only occurring during the annual anniversary of 
its beginning, the loss of tribal political power in the country has given few tribes the ability to 
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voice their stories and push for popular memorialization of the uprising. To illustrate the 
correlation between the loss of tribal power and the lack of remembrance, compared to the 
Herero and Nama, focus will be put on the largest, and one of the most influential tribes in the 
region, the Ngoni. When European settlers arrived in the region in the late nineteenth century, 
the Ngoni tribe in the southwestern region of Sonega, were regarded as a tribe of disciplined and 
fearless warriors. This sentiment was based on their authoritarian society, structured settlement 
pattern, and positive agricultural performance. Europeans viewed these as positive institutions 
and good values of discipline, strength, and order.  Initially, German missionaries believed that 
Ngoni society offered the possibility for other tribes to reject the barbaric elements and to 
civilize them.200  
The Ngoni, however, were one of the initial tribes to rebel against the Germans in 1905 
and participated throughout. However, as the Germans systematically cracked down on the 
tribe’s food production, its fighting began to wane. In 1906, the Germans captured and hanged 
nearly one hundred Ngoni elite and deported others as forced labor to the coast.201 The repression 
of the rebellion had effectively destroyed the old chieftain system of the Ngoni tribe and the 
population fell by up to one-half—from a pre-war population of 60,000 to 30,000 after 1907.202 
After the Germans were forced out of the region after World War I, and East Africa came under 
a British mandate, the colonial government continued to control the formerly strong tribe by 
taking control of its lands away from the chiefs.203   
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By the 1950s, the positive attitude once held towards the Ngoni tribe by German 
missionaries in the early twentieth century had begun to shift and transform. Under British 
control, the Ngoni were now viewed as lazy, undisciplined, backward, and non-progressive.204 In 
1954, the historian P.A. Gulliver described the stagnation of Ngoni life:  
Whether one surveys their agriculture, their housing, their diet, their standards of 
life or their ceremonial, one finds only a depressing poverty of ideas, ambition 
and an equally depressing resignation to its perpetuation.205 
 
Policies initiated by the British government in the mid-1940s began a process of resettlement that 
was to continue for the next four decades and had a profound effect on tribal power and the 
memory of the Maji Maji Uprising. The 1930s saw the colonial government institute a land 
policy in the Liwale region in southeast Tanganyika that favored nature over villages, with a goal 
of reducing tribal power and the risk of rebellion. This led to the movement of dozens of villages 
and the subsequent creation of the Selous Game Reserve in 1947.206  
After independence in 1961, Julius Nyerere commenced a nationwide villagization 
program as rural development took center-stage in an effort to modernize.207 In 1961, the Ngoni 
people formed the Ruvuma Development Association with the intention of developing cottage 
industries like wool, masonry, carpentry, and soap-making. This society was initially heralded as 
a government success, but soon developed strong opposition within its ranks. In September 1969, 
the government disbanded the association, confiscated their assets, and no longer allowed the 
tribe to assert its autonomy.208  
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In 1967, the Arusha Declaration saw the state assert increased control over agricultural 
production, which was soon followed by Operation Villagization.209 It was during this 
villagization period in the 1960s and 1970s that tribes from the south, in particular, were forcibly 
moved and forced to resettle in nearly 7,000 newly-created villages. This resettlement program 
led to the abandonment of traditional methods of farming and tribal ways of life 210 With 
President Nyerere ordering that all people were to live in villages by 1976, state control 
increased exponentially over rural areas and peoples, like the Ngoni.211 By the mid-1970s, the 
once prominent Ngoni had been forcibly resettled, with political power stripped from their 
control. 
The effects of this eradication and the reduction of tribal political power through forced 
villagization, along with the criminalization of witchcraft is reflected in how the Maji Maji 
rebellion is remembered and memorialized in contemporary Tanzania. Within the southern 
region where the war occurred, many people, even those descended from individuals who 
experienced the war first hand, are not knowledgeable about it. In interviews with tribespeople, 
many appeared to not know of the suffering that their ancestors went through. Speaking with an 
81-year-old man, historian Heike Schmidt discovered that the man was not told about the 
experience of his people and assumed that his people did not go hungry when the opposite was 
true.212 Another female individual stated that she did not know anything whatsoever about how 
her parents experienced the war, or anything about the war for that matter.213  
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In the present day, many of the people living within what is referred to as the “Maji Maji 
Zone” somewhat know about the war and have a limited understanding of the tribes that 
participated in the rebellion. However, people outside of this zone do not have the same level of 
understanding of the rebellion, if at all, or of the cultural history of the tribes involved.214 When 
it comes to memorialization of the rebellion, there exist only two nationally recognized 
monuments: one in Sonega and the other in Nandate.215 Additionally, remembrance of the 
rebellion takes place on one day, February 27, and occurs in only one area of the country, 
Ungoni, where the Sonega memorial is located. The day is dedicated to the 68 warriors who were 
executed by Germans on that day in 1905.216   
Political Power: Revival in Namibia 
As the Ngoni tribe lost its political power and its land, the memory of the Maji Maji 
faded from the minds of Tanzanians. In Namibia, however, the Herero people, nearly decimated 
after the end of the rebellion in 1907, would experience a transformation in their political, and 
cultural power; this transformation would see them spearhead remembrance and reparations for 
the genocide around the globe.  
After the end of the Namibia rebellion and before the First World War, many of the 
surviving Herero were used as forced labor on plantations and public infrastructure projects. 
During the military campaign in Southwest Africa in 1915, many Herero men deserted in masse 
from their places of forced employment and sided with the British forces.217 After the British 
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victory in the region in 1916, many of the Herero were freed from their forced labor.218 The 
Herero, now free from their laborious tasks, began to re-establish a major tenet of their culture—
cattle farming—which was formerly restricted and made illegal by the Germans.219 With the 
reestablishment of cattle farming, Herero survivors began to settle, many times illegally, on 
former lands that had been lost after German settlement in the region. The Herero began to 
reoccupy lands to such an extent that the tribe created a new leadership, and the English/South 
African administration was forced to recognize its legitimacy, as well as the right of the tribe to 
own cattle. 220  
By 1916, the government had established the first Herero reserve, measuring 30,000 
acres, and by 1921 additional reserves were granted for tribal use due to the extensive cattle 
herds it controlled.221 The Herero were becoming increasingly independent, seeking ways to 
express their identity. A Report on Native Affairs in 1919 stated that the Herero “have a very 
independent spirit…The native with just a few head of cattle considers it [unfair] [to] dig to 
work.”222 That same year, Namibia became a mandated territory of South Africa, and the Herero, 
having undergone a radical reconstruction, would now push for political change. With the newly-
created South African administration, one that pushed racist policies and racial superiority, the 
tribe soon realized that the inequality they had been subjected to under the Germans would 
continue and their land would not be returned to them.223 These realizations that the new 
government had the potential to be as unfavorable and dangerous as the German colonizers two 
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decades prior, led tribespeople to unite in opposition.224 Following the expulsion of the Germans 
and the South African mandate in the early 1920s, the Herero tribe, once on the brink of collapse, 
was now attempting to rebuild its political autonomy.  
Under the new government, Herero leaders, once in exile, returned to Namibia to 
strengthen the new chieftainship. Hoseah Kutako, the son of Samuel Maherero, was made regent 
of the tribe.225 It was during this time of transition that the Herero, historically militarized, once 
again organized themselves into armed regiments, or Otruppe, commanded by tribal leaders.226 
In 1920, the Universal Negro Improvement Association arrived in Namibia and the Herero 
leaders quickly warmed to the organization, eventually granting allegiance to it. The UNIA 
served as a catalyst for Herero communities to voice their grievances and accusations against the 
South African government.227 The UNIA in Namibia quickly expanded, soon becoming 
dominated in central Namibia by Herero, and by January 1922, 500 members were located in 
Windhoek, with regional offices opening in Swakopmund and other locations.228 The UNIA 
proved to be a crucial link to the political activity of the tribe for the next two decades, linking 
members in Namibia to other societies all around the globe.229 The push for political power 
amongst the Herero, started by the Universal Negro Improvement Association, would climax in 
the aftermath of World War II.  
After the end of World War II, a nationalist sentiment spread across the continent of 
Africa. In Namibia, these feelings led to the discussions about the establishment of a political 
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party mainly made up of Herero members.230 This newfound nationalistic sentiment spurred the 
Herero to immediately set about petitioning the United Nations to vote against incorporating the 
Namibian territory into the South African state, as was the original plan when the mandate was 
given to the country.231  In 1947, Chief Frederick Maherero and the Herero Chiefs Council 
drafted a petition to prevent incorporation into South Africa; in the 1950s, the Herero would send 
representatives to New York City to physically hand in further petitions against the maneuver.232 
The year 1959 saw Herero political ambitions become reality, with the creation of the South 
West African National Union, a predominantly Herero political party. In the early 1960s, this 
party internationalized the issues of the Herero tribe by opening foreign party offices, most 
notably in Cairo, Egypt.233   
Thus, the Herero tribe experienced a virtual rebirth and transformation after its near 
demise in 1907. The increasing political power of this tribe, in comparison to the tribes in East 
Africa, has caused the Herero and Nama genocide to become a nationwide event in 
contemporary Namibia. Since 1923, the Herero people have commemorated “Herero Day.” This 
date, August 26, marks the anniversary of the burial of Samuel Maherero in Oakhandja. In 1980, 
this tribal holiday became a national holiday, and was renamed “Heroes Day,” to commemorate 
the Namibian War of Independence, which began on August 26, 1966.234 Recently, the ruling 
party of the Namibian government, the South West Africa People’s Organization, have attempted 
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to increase awareness of the genocide and manage communal concerns amongst the Nama by 
celebrating the lives of Hendrik Witbooi, the leader of the tribe during the rebellion.235  
Physical memorials to the genocide are far more numerous, and widespread, than ones 
dedicated to the Maji Maji Rebellion in East Africa. The most notable national memorial is 
known as Heroes Acre, near Windhoek. This monument honors significant individuals that 
fought against colonialism and contains tributes to numerous Herero and Nama leaders who 
fought in the rebellion, including Witbooi, Maherero, and Jacob Morenga—a Nama guerilla 
fighter.236 Monuments to the genocide are not only found in Namibia; there are also two 
monuments that honor the native victims of the genocide located in Bremen, Germany.237  
Numbers 
Finally, numbers may be a factor is explaining the prominence of the events in Namibia, 
whereas those in Tanzania are largely forgotten. Namibia, compared to Tanzania, saw many 
more German soldiers deployed in response to the uprising (20,000 in Southwest Africa 
compared to 2,000 in East Africa.) In Southwest Africa, the Schutztruppe—native Germans—
made up an overwhelming number of colonial soldiers fighting against the Herero and Nama.238 
The numbers were very different in the case of East Africa, as the majority of the colonial 
soldiers were not Germans; rather they were native Africans recruited into German service, 
auxiliaries, or mercenaries. Additionally, the death rate among these German soldiers may have 
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influenced how the public, both in Germany and the settlers in these African regions, responded 
to these two concurrent events. The number of German soldiers who died in the campaigns 
against the Herero and Nama between 1904 and 1907 stands at 1,500. Comparatively, the total 
number of German soldiers who were killed during the Maji Maji Rebellion is only 15. With 
such a higher death rate in Namibia, Germans may have been much more aware of the unfolding 
calamity in Southwest Africa, where over 1,000 of their fellow compatriots died.  
The number of German deaths may have influenced how the German settler population 
and those in Germany remembered these two rebellions; however, the number of tribes involved 
in each of these events may also have influenced the memorialization of these colonial crimes 
against humanity. In the case of Southwest Africa, which involved two tribes, the Herero, as has 
been seen, experienced a rebirth and revitalization of its leadership and lands. As a product of 
this revival, the Herero were able to gain increasing political influence as the decades passed, 
culminating with the establishment of their own political party. This political might allowed 
them to describe, and keep alive, the event of 1904 on a national level, resulting in national and 
international remembrance. In Tanzania, the story was drastically different. Instead of two tribes 
involved in resisting colonial expansion, the Maji Maji uprising involved nearly 30 individual 
tribes. These individual tribes, many of which experienced steep declines in both population and 
leadership figures after the war and subsequent famine, did not have a collectively strong voice, 
unlike the Herero. Add to this lack of voice the political disenfranchisement during the British 
colonial government and the further loss of political power with forced villagization during the 
1970s, after Tanzanian independence, and the political power and collective voice these tribes 
have today is miniscule, compared to that of the Herero.  
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 Explaining the history and the subsequent remembrance and memorialization of two 
events that have not received substantial public attention can prove to be difficult. How does one 
explain the origins of memorialization of the events in Namibia and Tanzania, and explain how 
and why the Herero and Nama genocide has received substantially more public visibility in 
recent years than the Maji Maji Rebellion? In recent years, genocide studies have increased 
exponentially, and with the tragedy in Namibia being a clear case of systematic, intentional 
destruction of two peoples, this has led it to being increasingly studied as the first case of 
genocide in the twentieth century; the Maji Maji rebellion in East Africa, meanwhile, has not 
been framed by modern scholars as such an event.239 Connections to the Holocaust, both 
structural connections—in the forms of concentration camps and medical experimentation—and 
personal connections—Eugen Fischer, Franz Ritter von Epp, and Heinrich Goering— have led to 
recent comparisons between the Holocaust and the Namibia rebellion, as well as substantial 
investigations into whether the Herero and Nama genocide set a precedent for the Holocaust. The 
Herero tragedy has also seen its physical aftermath, in the form of human remains spread around 
the globe, bringing foreign countries into literal contact with the genocide. The attack on the 
heart of the uprising in Tanzania, maji, through witchcraft eradication movements; and the 
political differences between the once powerful Ngoni tribe in Tanzania and the Herero in 
Namibia, with the former losing its power and identity through forced government social 
programs, and the latter reorganizing, and reestablishing its important cultural and political 
institutions that have allowed it to lead the call of remembrance and memorialization. These 
variables have led to increased global attention on the tragedy in Namibia, which has led 
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increased pressure on Germany to recognize the events in Namibia as genocide and a push for 
reparations. Well into the twenty-first century, the German government did not recognize the 
Herero and Nama uprising for what it was: genocide. However, after increased media attention 
over the storage of human remains in both New York and Germany, the German government, in 
July 2016, finally considered the events as genocidal in nature.240 Following on the heel of this 
recognition, in January 2017, the Association of The Ovaherero Genocide in the USA sued 
Germany in U.S court, demanding damages for the tragedy.241 Shortly thereafter, the government 
of Namibia demanded $30 billion in reparations.242 As can be seen, recent events have begun to 
shine a light of much needed, and deserved, attention on these events. While the factors stated 
above have seemingly led the Namibian case to being covered, and remembered, more fully, the 
scholarship on both of these events have experienced a revival within the past five years and 
shows no signs of slowing as the reparations movements continue. The “Peace of the 
Graveyard,” as Paul Rohrbach emotionally described a desolate Namibia, is no longer so quiet; 
voices, calling for reparations, repatriations, and recognition, are steadily increasing in their furor 
and strength. One can only hope that the increased attention and focus on Namibia will influence 
reflection and action toward the other more widely forgotten rebellion in Tanzania. 
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